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Abstract 
This paper quantitatively evaluates the effects of several unconventional monetary policies. In 
particular, a new Keynesian model of a small-open economy is extended to include a liquidity 
premium, deviations from the uncovered interest rate parity condition, and a premium in the term 
structure of interest rates; allowing the Central Bank to set, in addition to the policy rate, the stock 
of base money, debt at different maturities and foreign assets. The model is calibrated to the case of 
Chile. We find that policies affecting the liquidity channel can potentially have a big effect, but they 
depend on expectations about the future policy rate. On the other hand, alternatives working 
through the term premium have smaller effects, but they are less dependent on the expected path of 
the reference rate. We also study the possibility of undoing the unconventional policy as a potential 
exit strategy, with results indicating that this alternative may induce a significant slowdown, 
particularly if it is anticipated. Finally, we also consider the alternative of driving down and holding 
the policy rate in its lower bound. While this policy can also be greatly expansionary, credibility 




Este artículo evalúa cuantitativamente el efecto de varias políticas monetarias no convencionales. 
En particular, se amplia un modelo neokeynesiano de economía pequeña y abierta para incluir tres 
fricciones —premios por liquidez, desviaciones de la paridad descubierta de tasas, y premios por 
plazo—, las que posibilitan al Banco Central determinar, además de la tasa de política, el nivel de 
base monetaria, deuda a diferentes plazos y las reservas internacionales. El modelo es calibrado 
para el caso de Chile. Los resultados indican que políticas que afectan el canal de liquidez pueden 
potencialmente generar importantes expansiones, pero su efectividad depende en gran medida de las 
expectativas sobre el comportamiento futuro de la tasa de política. Por otro lado, alternativas que 
actúan a través del canal premios por plazo producen expansiones menores pero que no están 
significativamente influidas por el comportamiento futuro de la tasa de referencia. También se 
estudia la posibilidad de deshacer las políticas no convencionales como eventual estrategia de 
salida, encontrando que esta alternativa puede inducir recesiones significativas, particularmente si 
son anticipadas. Finalmente, se considera la opción de llevar la tasa de política a cero y mantenerla 
en ese nivel por un tiempo predeterminado, observándose que esta política también puede tener 
efectos expansivos importantes; aunque las cuestiones relacionadas con la credibilidad de los 
anuncios también son relevantes en este caso. 
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In normal times, most Central Banks use the nominal interest rate as the policy instrument to achieve
their inﬂation goals. However, when the policy rate reaches its lower bound the monetary authority
has to look for alternative (or unconventional) policies. What are the diﬀerent tools that a Central
Bank can use in such a situation? What are the quantitative eﬀects of these policies? Although there
is a signiﬁcant branch of the literature that has evaluated the virtues of diﬀerent options,1 the analysis
of the quantitative impact of diﬀerent unconventional policies is much less frequent.2 Moreover, while
until recently the experience of Japan (having a near-zero interest rate since the mid 1990’s) was the
only case of study, nowadays the aggressive response of many Central Banks aimed to dampen the
eﬀects of the 2008 crisis -taking the interest rate to its lower bound- further emphasizes the need for
a quantitative assessment of diﬀerent policy alternatives.
This paper is an attempt in this direction, presenting a quantitative exploration of diﬀerent alterna-
tives based on a dynamic and stochastic general equilibrium model. In particular, we extend a simple
new Keynesian model of a small open economy to include three frictions: a liquidity premium that
introduces a gap between the policy rate and that of short-term debt, which depends on the velocity
of base money; a portfolio-balance eﬀect for the determination of the nominal exchange rate (implying
a deviation from the uncovered interest rate parity, UIP); and a premium in the term structure of
interest rates that depends on the relative stock of short and long maturity of debt. These frictions,
although introduced in an ad-hoc way, allow the Central Bank to choose not only the interest rate as
its policy tool, but the stock of money, short and long term debt and foreign assets as well.
We use this model to evaluate the dynamics generated by diﬀerent changes in the Central Bank’s
balance sheet, taking into account the expected path for the policy rate, alternative “exit strategies”,
the possibility of (exogenous) lack of credibility in the policy announcements, and the role of the zero
lower bound. Frictions are estimated, and the model is calibrated, to the case of Chile, which is one
of the several countries that have driven the policy rate down to its lower bound during the current
crisis. In addition, from a methodological perspective, we introduce a novel algorithm to analyze these
type of exercises in the context of linear rational expectations models, which is based on the idea of
backward induction.
The results appears to indicate that polices working through the liquidity channel can potentially
have important expansionary eﬀects; which are generated not by the direct eﬀect that a monetary ex-
pansion have in reducing the rate faced by households, but rather through the expected future inﬂation
that the increase in base money generates. However, these eﬀects greatly depend on the perception
about the future path of the interest rate and its credibility. On the other hand, policies aimed to
reduce the term premium, while generating smaller expansions, are less dependent on the expected
behavior of the policy rate and on credibility issues. The channel associated with the deviations from
the UIP condition seems to be of minor importance.
We also consider the possibility of undoing the original change in the balance sheet as a possible
exit strategy. This exercise shows that reversing the unconventionally policy can generate important
contractions, particularly if these changes are anticipated. Finally, we study the beneﬁts of driving
the policy rate down to its lower bound and maintaining it at that value for some time, ﬁnding that
1See, for instance, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Svensson (2001) and Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), among
many others.
2One exception is the work of Coenen and Wieland (2003) who analyze several alternatives for the case of Japan.
1this policy can by itself be highly expansionary, although the issues regarding the credibility of the
announcement are also relevant in this case.
In terms of the related literature, several reasons explain the lack of studies quantifying the eﬀect
of unconventional policies. First, it is diﬃcult to estimate the impact of these policies directly from
the data. For, at least until recently, the lower bound episodes were almost exceptional, limiting the
power of direct econometric inference. The alternative is to use a model to tackle these issues, which is
the route taken in this paper. However, this is not a trivial task either. On one hand, allowing for the
interest rate to have a lower limit entails to consider non-linearities in the model, which are generally
diﬃcult to handle computationally. On the other hand, even assuming that we can circumvent the
computational issues, most models (particularly in the new-Keynesian tradition) are not rich enough
to allow for the monetary authority to use several diﬀerent instruments. For instance, the role of
money and liquidity is generally absent in these model, as well as the role ﬁnancial frictions.3 In
this work, we tackle the non-linearity by allowing the interest rate to be ﬁxed at an arbitrary value
(possibly zero) for some time as a way to capture deviations from the linear Taylor rule,4 and we
introduce frictions, although in an ad-hoc way, in order to consider diﬀerent policy tools.5
Before turning to the analysis, a caveat is in order concerning the type of alternative policies
analyzed in this paper. The term unconventional policy has been used somehow vaguely, referring to
a number of alternative tools that simply depart from the usual management of the monetary policy
rate (e.g., in terms of a model, an unconventional policy could be any departure from the Taylor rule).
One of such an alternative implemented during the recent crisis was the purchase by Central Banks
of risky ﬁnancial assets that were not part of the usual portfolio of these institutions, a type of policy
that is generally labeled as credit policy. The goal of these alternatives is to try to reduce a ﬁnancial
distortion that have widen due to the drop in the price of assets used as collateral (e.g. mortgage-
backed securities). Moreover, it is likely the case that these Central Banks would have implemented
this same type of strategies regardless of the policy rate reaching its lower bound. Although these
alternatives are relevant to discuss as well, we do not analyze them in this paper for at least two
reasons. First, these are not the only type of policies that have been evaluated and/or implemented;
for many countries did not have to deal with a situation of deep ﬁnancial distress.6 This paper is then
more representative of the situation faced by countries like Chile, Sweden, Australia, among others,
that drove the policy rate to its lower limit and had to look for other alternatives to stimulate the
economy. Second, and related to a point previously highlighted, there is in the literature no clear
modeling strategy that would allow us to consider these issues; although as we mentioned signiﬁcant
3Some recent studies attempt to expand the basic framework in these lines; for instance, Curdia and Woodford (2009)
and Gertler and Karadi (2009).
4Although we allow for non-linearities, we are still focusing on a local solution, as most studies in this topic do.
Another branch of the literature characterizes global solutions, showing that important diﬀerences may arise; most
remarkably, the possibility of converging to a liquidity trap (see, for instance, Benhabib et al., 2001). This alternative is
however no explored in this paper.
5The fact that frictions are not micro-funded is clearly a drawback of the analysis. However, given that the literature
has not yet arrived to a consensus on which are the relevant frictions or how to model them, this analysis can provide
some insight on which are the relevant parts of the model (or “wedges”) that should be the focus of this research agenda.
6In fact, C´ espedes et al. (2009) compile a list of 56 policy announcements regarding unconventional policies, in the
period from September 2008 to October 2009, for a group of 13 central banks the generally implement (explicit or
implicitly) inﬂation targets, ﬁnding that only 12 of these announcements were related with assets purchase programs
or direct lending to (non-banks) ﬁnancial ﬁrms, which were implemented by four central banks (Canada, Switzerland,
England and the U.S.).
2progress is being made in this direction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the frictions introduced as well as
the alternative policy tools that the Central Bank has available. We also show there the estimation
exercise using Chilean data. In section 3 we present the quantitative results, where we analyze the role
of diﬀerent expected paths for the policy rate, lack of credibility and possible exit strategies. Finally,
section 4 concludes.
2 Frictions and Alternative Instruments for the Central Bank
In each period t, the Central Bank (CB) decides on four types of assets: base money (Mt), foreign
reserves (B∗CB
t , with rate i∗
tcpt)7, and domestic debt of both short and long maturity (DCB
1,t and DCB
k,t ,
respectively, with rates i1,t and ik,t).8 Additionally, it choses the monetary policy rate iMP
t .
In normal times, policy is conducted through a familiar Taylor rule,9
ˆ iMP
t = ρiˆ iMP
t−1 + (1 − ρi)(απˆ πt + αyˆ yt). (1)
On the other hand, the unconventional policies that we will consider have two components: ﬁrst, the
policy rate is ﬁxed at some value (either its steady state level or zero) for some time and, second, the
CB changes the position of an asset in its balance sheet, compensated by a change in another asset
such that the bank’s total net worth is kept constant in nominal terms, i.e.
(StB∗CB
t − St−1B∗CB





where St denotes the nominal exchange rate.10
We would like to consider a speciﬁcation that allows the CB to set not only iMP
t but also any element
in its balance sheet. In standard models this is not possible: the demand for real balances determines
the stock of money for a given iMP
t , non-arbitrage conditions determine the diﬀerent interest rates, and
the uncovered interest parity (UIP) pins down the exchange rate. A way to overcome this impossibility
is to introduce frictions (such as liquidity premium and portfolio-balance eﬀects), implying that the
stock of diﬀerent assets will have a direct eﬀect in their respective rates.11
First, we assume a gap between the rates i1,t and iMP
t , which depends on the velocity of base
money. In particular,
ˆ i1,t −ˆ iMP
t = −ϕm(ˆ mt − ˆ pt − ˆ yt). (3)
Such a gap can be derived under several model alternatives. For instance, Sims (2009) obtains a similar
relationship by assuming that, in a model with transaction costs, money pays an interest rate (which
he interprets as the interest rate charged in the reserves market). In such a framework, the diﬀerence
7cpt is the country premium that “closes” this small open economy model.
8That a CB can issue its own debt is not a commonly observed characteristic, but it is the case for Chile. More




k,t as the negative of
the CB holdings of treasury bonds.
9We use small-caps hatted variables to denote log-deviations from the steady state.
10In principle, this is not the only possibility that one can consider. But allowing for a change in the CB net worth
would require to set a rule for the evolution of this variable, and it is not clear how this rule should be speciﬁed (nor
there is guidance in the literature on these issues). This exercise, on the other hand, is simpler and will allow us to
obtain a cleaner intuition.
11We will assume that these frictions disappear in the non-stochastic steady state.
3between the rate on bonds and the rate on reserves positively depends on velocity. Another alternative
would be, in line with the work by Reynard and Schabert (2009), to explicitly model the market for
money. In that work it assumed that only short term bonds are eligible for money acquisitions, which
generates a liquidity premium and a gap between the rate on bonds and the policy rate. Additional,
according to that framework, the liquidity injections considered here can be thought as a deviation
from the usual rule that the central bank has in terms of the size of repo operations.
This gap allows the CB to simultaneously choose iMP
t and Mt as policy variables.12 Qualitatively,
given this friction, a permanent increase in the stock of Mt will have, ceteris paribus, two eﬀects. On
on hand, the reduction of i1,t will increase desired consumption. On the other hand, the rise in Mt will
increase the price level which, in the presence of price rigidities, will generate expectations of future
inﬂation, reducing the real interest rate and further expanding consumption demand.
We also consider deviations from the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) such that,
ˆ st − Et{ˆ st+1} −ˆ i∗
t − ˆ cpt +ˆ i1,t = ϕs(∆ˆ b∗BC
t ), (4)
where ∆ denotes the ﬁrst diﬀerence operator. In this way, changes in the CB holdings of foreign assets
will have a direct eﬀect (ceteris paribus) on the nominal exchange rate.13
Finally, we also consider a premium in the yield curve structure that aﬀect intertemporal decisions.
In particular, we postulate that the Euler condition is,
ˆ λt = Et{ˆ λt+1} +ˆ i1,t − Et{ˆ πt+1} + ∆ˆ tpt,
where λt is the marginal utility of consumption and
ˆ tpt ≡ˆ ik,t −
k−1  
j=0
Et{ˆ i1,t+j} = ϕk
 
ˆ dBC




Therefore, diﬀerent combinations of long and short term debt will have ﬁrst order eﬀects in consump-
tion decisions.14 In particular, either increases in DCB
1,t or drops in DCB
k,t will shift consumption demand
upwards.
The rest of the model is presented in the Appendix. It correspond to a small-open-new-Keynesian
economy, with consumers featuring separable preferences on consumption and leisure, domestic ﬁrms
producing using labor only and facing a Calvo problem in setting prices (with fully indexation to past
inﬂation), complete pass-through, and ﬂexible wages.15 Although this is a highly stylized model, its
simplicity will help to better understand the intuition behind the diﬀerent alternatives.
12From a technical point of view, ϕm > 0 allows to anchor inﬂation expectations (i.e. it yields uniqueness) even if the
momentary policy rate is always ﬁxed.
13A similar deviation from UIP gap can be obtained in a model with costly international portfolio adjustment costs.
See, for instance, Sierra (2008)
14In principle, we could consider the possibility of ∆ˆ tpt entering the Euler equation with a coeﬃcient diﬀerent than
one. However, to estimate such a coeﬃcient will be diﬃcult, for there is no monthly data on consumption.
15The parameters where calibrated following the estimation results from Medina and Soto (2007) (see the Appendix
for details).
42.1 Estimating the Frictions
Given the frictions previously introduced, diﬀerent changes in the CB balance sheet may have diﬀerent
expansionary eﬀects. To quantify these eﬀects we need to assign values to the parameter describing
these frictions, ϕm, ϕs and ϕm, which we will obtain by estimating equations (3) to (5) using monthly
Chilean data from 01-2003 to 05-2009. Before proceeding with the estimation, it is relevant to mention
several data limitations. First, even though there is data available on the total stock of bonds of the
Central Bank of Chile (CBCh) on circulation, the data is not rich enough to obtain a long series for
the stock of bonds at diﬀerent maturities. In addition, although nowadays the CBCh has available a
rich maturity structure for its bonds, this has not been always the case, and only the two-years bond
in pesos (BCP2) has a long enough series of interest rates. Given these caveats, we explain as follows
how these parameters were estimated.
In term of equation (3), iMP
t is measured by the monetary policy rate set by the CBCh, i1,t is
the 90-days deposit rate,16 M is the monetary base, output is the monthly index of economic activity
(IMACEC) and the price level is the core consumer price index (IPCX1).17 The equation was estimated
by GMM obtaining,18
ˆ i1,t −ˆ iMP
t = −0.0014
(0.0007)
(ˆ mt − ˆ pt − ˆ yt).
For equation (4), the foreign interest rate is the Federal Funds Rate and the country premium is
the EMBI, the stock of government foring assets B∗CB
t was measured the net foreign asset element
in CBCh balance sheet, and the three-month-ahead expectation of the nominal exchange rate comes
from the Expectations Survey collected by the CBCh. The results were,
ˆ st − Et{ˆ st+1} −ˆ i∗
t − cpt +ˆ i1,t = 0.2047
(0.036)
(∆ˆ dt).
Finally, for equation (5) the rate of nominal 2-year bonds was used as a measure for ik,t and the
expectations about the future short rate also comes from the Expectations Survey. Because, as we
commented before, there is no data on the stock of bonds at diﬀerent maturities we measure ˆ dBC
k,t − ˆ dBC
1,t
as the diﬀerence between the total stock of bonds in pesos and the stock of 90-days commercial and












Finally, it is relevant to highlight that these equations are not meant to represent a full theory to
explain these gaps observed in the data (e.g. not all deviations from UIP are due to exchange rate
interventions). Actually, the share of the variance of the left-hand-side variables explained by the
proposed regressors is generally low.19 Nevertheless, the fact that the coeﬃcients display the correct
16All rates are quarterly to be consistent with the calibration of the model.
17These two series have been seasonally adjusted. The source for all the series is the Central Bank of Chile.
18We use ﬁve lags of the Federal Funds Rate, the EMBI index, the rate on 5-year bonds in pesos (BCP5) and the
90-days deposit rate, as well as of the right-hand-side variable, as instruments. In addition, an AR(1) error term was
included. Adding lags of the dependent variable does not improve the goodness of ﬁt of the equation. Newey-West robust
standard errors in parenthesis. This same instrument-selection strategy was followed for the other equations as well.
19This, in part, motivates the inclusion of AR(1) error term in the regressions.
5sign and appear to be statistically diﬀerent from zero suggests that some explanatory power can be
attributed to the proposed regressors.
3 The Eﬀect of Unconventional Policies
We proceed with the numerical exercises in four steps. First, we study the eﬀects of a given change in
the CB balance sheet assuming that iMP
t remains ﬁxed in its steady state value forever. Although this
is clearly not a realistic assumption, it will be useful to grasp the intuition behind the dynamics implied
by the diﬀerent alternatives. Second, we analyze what happens if the CB promises to keep iMP
t ﬁxed at
its steady state value only for a limited period of time, using the Taylor rule afterwards. Additionally,
we allow people to assign an exogenous probability to the event that the CB returns to the Taylor
rule before it was promised. Third, we consider the possibility of undoing the unconventional policy
(either by a surprise or with an anticipated announcement) as a possible exit strategy. Finally, we
evaluate the virtues of driving the policy rate down to zero and maintaining at that level for some
time, both as a policy alternative by itself and also to complement the eﬀect of movements in the CB
balance sheet.
To keep the analysis as clean as possible we will not assume that the economy is hit by a negative
shock that motives the use of an unconventional policy, neither we study what is the optimal response
to such a shock (as analyzed, for instance, by Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003, in the context of a
much simpler model).20 Our goal is somehow simpler: to understand what is the eﬀect of a given
policy regardless of the shock that is hitting the economy. While the question of what is the optimal
response to a recessionary shocks is clearly an important one, we will proceed in this way so we can
better understand the diﬀerent channels through which the unconventional policy alternatives aﬀect
the economy. Additionally, if we were to use a shock to represent, for instance, the 2008 crisis, it is
not clear either which type of shocks should be considered.
3.1 Fixing iMP
t Forever
The exercise we consider ﬁrst is to ﬁx iMP
t at its steady state value forever and to permanently change
two components of the CB balance sheet in such a way that equation (2) is satisﬁed. In particular,
we assume that the change in the balance sheet is equivalent to 10% of nominal GDP in steady state.
Figure 1 shows the eﬀect of a purchase of foreign assets ﬁnanced with an increase in the stock of
money. This policy generates an increase of 6.1% on inﬂation and a rise on GDP of 3.7% on impact,
and these possite eﬀects last for several quarters. The fact that the response of inﬂation lies always
above zero indicates, in line with the discussion before, that the price level experiences a permanent
change in the long run.21 This change does not fully materialize in the ﬁrst quarter due to the price
rigidities, generating, in particular, an increase in expected inﬂation. This rise in expectations reduces
the ex-ante real interest rate, rt ≡ i1,t − Etπt+1, which has an expansionary eﬀect. In principle, this
rate is also reduced by the drop in i1,t. However, as can be seen in the ﬁgure, i1,t decreases by little
compared with the increase in Etπt+1.
20However, the algorithm presented in the appendix can be accommodated to consider the type of shocks analyzed in
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
21Actually, given that equation (3) depends on velocity, and given that the stock of money increases by 10% of GDP,
the integral of the response of inﬂation should be 10%, which is veriﬁed numerically.
6This alternative also has an eﬀect through the exchange rate channel in equation (4). To see how
important this mechanism is, the dashed-dotted line in ﬁgure 1 displays the same response assuming
ϕs = 0. As can be seen, the responses are really similar compared to the benchmark case, which
further emphasizes the role of the increase in expected inﬂation as the relevant channel.
Monetary expansions can also be used to purchase either type of CB debt. In this case, the channel
in equation (4) will play no role, but we may have an additional expansionary eﬀect if long debt is
acquired, for it reduces the term premium in equation (5). Figure 2 displays the dynamics under both
alternatives. We can observe eﬀects on impact on GDP and inﬂation similar to the previous exercise,
with a slightly bigger eﬀect in the case of a purchase of DCB
k,t . There is a somehow smaller response on
the real exchange rate in this case (the impact response in the previous case was a real depreciation
of near 5.3%, while in this case it is around 4.7%), but in general the dynamics are similar indicating
that this alternative also creates an expansionary eﬀect trough the rise of inﬂation expectations.
In terms of policies that do not involve monetary expansions, Figure 3 plots the responses to a
purchase of long debt ﬁnanced by new short debt, a policy that has a direct eﬀect through the term
premium channel in equation (5). This alternative generates a milder expansion of GDP and inﬂation
on impact, 0.3% and 0.05% respectively. While the nominal exchange rate depreciates in this case,
there is a real appreciation on impact which partially explains this smaller response. Moreover, given
the shape of the inﬂation path, the real interest rate actually rise and therefore the expectations
channel is not present in this case.
Finally, ﬁgure 4 shows the eﬀect of a purchase of foreign assets ﬁnanced with either long or short
new debt. In this case, both the friction aﬀecting the UIP condition, equation (4), and the yield curve,
equation (5), are in place. However, we can see that the eﬀect on output is only positive when the
operation involves an increase in DCB
1,t , which appears to indicate that the second channel is relatively
more important. Additionally, while the increase in output is smaller compared with the case in ﬁgure
3, the response of inﬂation (at least on impact) brought about by the nominal depreciation is bigger
in this case, although this change is reversed in the second quarter.
Overall, these exercises highlight that policies working through the liquidity channel may have
signiﬁcant eﬀects, while other alternatives can also have expansionary eﬀect but of a smaller magnitude.
However, the maintained assumption so far is that the monetary policy rate is expected to remain
ﬁxed forever. In what follows, we relax this important assumption.
3.2 A Temporary Fix of iMP
t
We consider the following exercise. At time t0, the CB announces that the policy rate is going to
stay ﬁxed until period T − 1, and from T onwards it will be determined according to the Taylor Rule
in equation (1).22 Additionally, it announces an unconventional policy, which also takes place at t0
but that will never be reversed (an alternative that we consider in the next subsection). Everybody
believes that, beginning on period T, the Taylor rule will be in place and that it will stay for any
t ≥ T. However, for t ∈ [t0,T − 2], while the interest rate is ﬁxed, people assign an exogenous
probability sequence pt to the CB breaking its promise and setting the nominal interest rate according
to the Taylor rule staring on t + 1. Moreover, if this is the case, they believe that the Taylor rule
22It is relevant to notice that, while this introduces a non-linearity in the model, it is not the same as imposing a
lower bound on the interest rate. In particular, once the Taylor rule returns, it might perfectly be the case that the rule
indicates to reduce the policy rate.
7will stay forever. Finally, regardless of people not trusting the CB, we assume that (ex-post) it fulﬁlls
its promises and actually waits until T to use the Taylor rule. The Appendix presents an algorithm,
based on the idea of backward induction applied to linear rational expectation models, that can be
used to compute the equilibrium trajectories under these assumptions. The algorithm also constrains
the equilibrium path to satisfy the non-negativity constrain on the policy rate.
We begin with the case a purchase of foreign assets ﬁnanced by a monetary expansion. Figure 5
shows the dynamics for diﬀerent T’s, assuming full credibility (i.e. pt = 0). As can be seen, allowing the
Taylor rule to return after some time signiﬁcantly dampens the expansionary eﬀects of this alternative.
For instance, if the policy rate is ﬁxed for eight quarters, the impact response of output is near 0.9%,
dropping to close to 0.2% for T = 2, while these ﬁgures for inﬂation are, respectively, close to 2%
and 0.7%. These are signiﬁcantly smaller than the rise of 3.7% on GDP and 6.1% of inﬂation that is
generated if iMP
t stays ﬁxed ad inﬁnitum.
In part, this smaller eﬀect is due to the qualitatively diﬀerent response of inﬂation: while before
it used to lie completely above zero, now it increases on impact, decreases to a negative value in the
second quarter and then it becomes positive and converges to zero from above.23 This diﬀerent path
for inﬂation transaltes into a less expansionary path for the real interest rate, which now actually
increases on impact and then becomes negative, converging to zero from below. Although the inﬁnite
sum of the real interest rate (i.e. the relevant measure for the determination of consumption according
to the IS curve) is still negative (close to -0.6% when T = 8), it is signiﬁcantly smaller that before
(almost -4%) which explains why the response of output has dampen in this case.
However, this is only a part of the explanation, for the shape of the inﬂation path changes in this
case because inﬂation is more aﬀected by the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate than before,
which explains why it decreases below zero in the second quarter.24 In particular, if ϕs = 0 the
response of inﬂation lies completely above zero. However, it is still the case that the convergence of
the price level to its new steady state is much slower.
The diﬀerence in terms of the speed of convergence of the price level is clearly due to the expected
rise in the policy rate. In particular, although this increase is small (less than 3 basis point when
T = 2), the path of the interest rate also lies above zero for a signiﬁcant period of time (until the
price level converges to its new steady state value).25 Of course, this description cannot be interprated
causally, for both inﬂation and interest rates are jointly determined in equilibrium. However, it is
clear that the anticipation of the return to the Taylor rule signiﬁcantly limits the expansionary eﬀect
that this policy alternative may have.
We consider next the eﬀect of lack of credibility. Figure 6 shows the same unconventional policy,
ﬁxing T = 6, and setting pt = pt for diﬀerent values of p (this implies that, as times goes by and people
see that the CB has actually kept its promise, the assigned probability of an anticipated return to the
Taylor rule decreases). This lack of credibility also dampens the expansionary eﬀect that this policy
may have. In particular, for p = 0 the impact increase in GDP is close to 0.5%, but with p = 0.9 it
23The cumulative response of inﬂation (i.e. the price level) is the same in the long run in both cases (equal to 10% as
we dicussed before. However, while in the case of i
MP
t ﬁxed forever the convergence was after just a few periods, it takes
now more than 3000 quarters to reach this value.
24Actually, as can be seen in Figure 1, the response of inﬂation also displayed a small negative bump in the second
quarter even with the policy rate ﬁxed forever. However, the response in inﬂation in that case was so large that this had
a minor impact.
25Taking together, while the inﬁnite sum of the real interest rate is more negative if ϕs = 0 (close to -1.2% when
T = 8), it is still signiﬁcantly smaller than what it was in the case of the polict rate ﬁxed forever.
8drops to almost 0.3%. The response of inﬂacion is also milder the higher this probability is, although
the diﬀerence are relatively smaller. Overall, the patterns are anyway similar to those described for
the case of pt = 0.26
We can also consider how are the results aﬀected if the unconventional policy implemented is
a purchase of long term debt ﬁnanced with new short term debt. Figure 7 show the dynamics for
diﬀerent T’s, keeping pt = 0. Compared with the case of a monetary expansion, here the responses of
output and inﬂation are not that sensitive to changes in T. Actually, the eﬀects seem to be slightly
bigger than the case of iMP
t ﬁxed forever, and the responses of both variables lie now completely above
zero. This diﬀerent shapes particularly generates a drop in real interest rate, and although the policy
rate rises once the Taylor rule returns, the increase is quite small and the real rate remains below zero
for several period.27 Finally, we analyze the eﬀect of this policy when people assigns a positive but
decreasing probability to the early return of the Taylor rule, a case described in 8. It appears that the
dynamics are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected either when we allow for pt to vary.
3.3 Undoing the Unconventional Policy
Part of the current discussion about unconventional policies is about possible “exit strategies”, which
is clearly a broad term. In principle, one can consider to return to the usual Taylor rule being, by
itself, an exit strategy. However, the discussion appears to focus on undoing the unconventional policy
initially implemented. For instance, one might be worried about the eﬀects that the excess of liquidity
introduced. As an example, we described before how a policy that entails increases in M can generate
signiﬁcant persistence in the inﬂation process once the Taylor rule is reintroduced. In what follows,
we present several exercises that help to sharpen this discussion.28
A ﬁrst alternative is to consider the same policies as before (i.e. the CB announces an unconven-
tional policy and that iMP
t will be ﬁxed until T − 1, an the Taylor rule will be used for t > T), and
to additionally assume that the CB also announces that in period T − k (with k ∈ [0,T − t0 + 1])
the unconventional policy will be completely reversed (assuming, for the moment, full credibility).29
For instance, if at t0 the CB buys foreign assets using base money, at T − k it sells the same amount
of dollars in exchange for currency. This alternative is considered in ﬁgure 9, which displays the
equilibrium paths for diﬀerent values of k. To clarify the exercise, the ﬁgure also displays the paths
for Mt and B∗BC
t . It is clear that the anticipation of the reversal further dampens the expansion,
actually generating a recession in most cases. In particular, the smaller the k, the more negative the
responses of output an inﬂation are. This is because the policy reversal is contractionary and the
eﬀect is partially mitigated if the nominal rate remains ﬁxed for more time.
These responses can be rationalized by realizing that the mechanism generating the expansion with
a policy that expands M (i.e. the expected rise in the price level) disappears when the reversal is
anticipated. Figure 10 actually shows that gradually undoing the unconventional policy is even worst
26Other policies that entail an increase in M also show similar results as those obtained in this case.
27This actually suggest that, for this type of policy, the responses vary non-monotonically with changes in T. In the
case of a monetary expansion, the bigger the T the bigger and closer to the case of i
MP
t ﬁxed forever the responses were.
In this case, on the contrary, there seems to be a value for T (in the numerical exercises it is close to 25) such that the
responses are bigger at to that point, becoming closer to the case in Figure 3 afterwards.
28To simplify the exposition, we will just show the case of a purchase of foreign currency ﬁnanced by a monetary
expansion. The other alternatives yield qualitatively similar results.
29As shown in the Appendix, the algorithm can be generalized to consider this alternative.
9when the change is anticipated, while ﬁgure 11 illustrates the if people believes that the change can
occur earlier the economy contracts even further.
We also explore the possibility of undoing the unconventional policy unexpectedly. Figure 12
displays the dynamics for diﬀerent values of k, for the case of full reversal at T − k. Evidently,
the impact response is the same we described in the previous subsection, and when the policy is
undone we have a contraction, with output dropping slightly below zero at that time and inﬂation
also becoming negative. What actually mitigates the negative eﬀect on output is the fact that the
shock is unanticipated: although inﬂation drops on impact at T − k, it is expected to be positive in
the next period (partly due to the dynamics of the nominal exchange rate), making the real interest
rate negative and generating an increase in consumption demand. However, it is relevant to highlight
that when the Taylor rule returns, the policy rates displays a minor drop (of less than a basis point)
because both output and inﬂation converge to zero from below slowly. Finally, the case of a gradual
reversal starting at T − k is considered in Figure 13. This reversal produces a bigger drop in output
and inﬂation. However, inﬂation now converges from above zero and, consistently, the policy rate rises
after period T.
3.4 Driving iMP
t to the Lower Bound
So far we have assumed the policy rate remaining ﬁxed at its steady state level for some time, as a
way to complement the eﬀects of changes in the CB balance sheet. However, we can alternatively
consider the possibility of the CB driving the policy rate all the way down to its lower bound, which
is also in line with the recent experience. For instance, C´ espedes et al. (2009) document that, in a
group of 20 countries with (implicit or explicit) inﬂation targets, 13 of them drove the policy rate
down to a lower bound at some point after September 2008 and have maintained it there for an
extended period of time. Additionally, while maintaining the rate at its lower bound can be seen as
a complementary action to enhance the eﬀects of movements in the balance sheet, driving the policy
rate to zero and leaving it there for some time also implies a departure from the usual Taylor rule.
Therefore, we can consider this action as an unconventional policy by itself, regardless of its potential
role in complementing movements in the balance sheet.
Figure 14 shows the responses associated with a decrease (from its steady state value) of the policy
rate down to zero, leaving it at that value for alternative horizons, and assuming that afterwards
this rate is determined by the Taylor rule.30 As can be seen, this policy alternative have important
expansionary eﬀects: for instance, if the rate drops to zero and remains at this value for one quarter,
output increases by near 5% while inﬂation rises by almost 7%. In addition, we can see that the
key channel for this eﬀect is the reduction in the ex-ante real interest rate. To put these numbers
in context, in order to obtain a similar response (on impact) for both inﬂation and output with an
expansionary monetary shock to the Taylor rule, we would require a disturbance generating a drop on
impact in the policy rate to -17% (in annual terms).
It is relevant to mention at this point an important caveat, particularly in trying to interpret these
numbers in the context of recent experiences. If we were to hit this economy with a negative shock
in the spirit of current events, the ﬁnal response will not be equivalent to simply add to the ﬁgure
presented the impulse response generated by the negative shock; for the presence of the zero bound
30Notice that because the ﬁgure plots log-deviations from steady state, the lower bound in the graph corresponds to
a value close to -1.6% (given that the steady state of this rate is, in annual, terms is 6.5%).
10imposes non linearities in the solution. As we mentioned before, we are reluctant to consider such a
shock because it is not clear which one should be considered, nor it is obvious how to calibrate its size.
Nevertheless, it is still important to highlight that initial conditions might not only aﬀect the size but
the dynamics of the responses as well.
As we did before, we can also analyze the role of (exogenous) credibility in the announcement
of the policy rate staying at zero for some time. Figure 15 displays the response for the case in
which it is announced that the Taylor rule will return after six quarters, but with people assigning
a probability pt = pt to the anticipated return of the Taylor rule in t + 1. In line with the results
obtained previously, the eﬀects of lack of credibility can be pervasive in this case as well; signiﬁcantly
dampening the expansionary eﬀects brought about by the zero bound.
Finally, we could also consider the role of driving the policy rate down to zero in complementing
unconventional policies that alter the CB balance sheet. However, given that the expansionary eﬀects
brought about by the drop in the interest rate are of an order of magnitude larger than what we have
obtained in subsection 3.2, it can be veriﬁed that adding movements in the balance sheet generate
only minor diﬀerences compared to the results in ﬁgures 14 and 15.
4 Conclusions
This paper uses a new Keynesian model of a small-open economy to provide a quantitative evaluation
of diﬀerent policy alternatives that a CB can use when the nominal interest rate is ﬁxed. In particular,
we have analyzed the eﬀects of diﬀerent changes in the CB balance-sheet, such as movements in the
holdings of foreign assets, base money and debt at diﬀerent maturities. To allow for the possibility of
the CB changing these assets, the standard model was extended to include several frictions; namely,
a liquidity premium, deviations from the UIP condition, and a premium in the term structure of
interest rates. Additionally, we introduced an algorithm that allows to take into account issues like
the anticipation of future polices, the (exogenous) lack of credibility in the announcements and the
role of the zero bound.
The results show that polices working through the liquidity channel can potentially have important
expansionary eﬀects, although its impact greatly depends on the perception about the future path of
the interest rate and its credibility. On the other hand, policies aimed to reduce the term premium,
while generating smaller expansions, are less dependent on the expected behavior of the policy rate and
on credibility issues. Additionally, it seems that reversing the unconventionally policy as a possible exit
strategy might not be beneﬁcial, particularly if these changes are anticipated. Finally, we described
how driving the policy rate down to its lower bound and maintaining it at that value for some time
can be highly expansionary as well, although the issues regarding the credibility of the announcement
are also relevant in this case.
It is useful to compare these results with those in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). Using a simpler
model (in particular, a closed economy), their analysis suggests that the channel that is relevant to
escape from a zero-bound situation is to aﬀect the expectations about future inﬂation. Moreover,
they show that the optimal policy in such a situation is a price level target. In our case, although we
are not characterizing the optimal policy, we have described that the potentially big eﬀect generated
by policies aﬀecting the liquidity premium are due to the increase in the future price level brought
about by the permanent increase in base money, resembling the channel emphasized by these authors.
11Additionally, they also highlight that the eﬀectiveness of this policy depends on the credibility of the
announcement.31
It is also worth to mention that, although in our set up is money what helps to reduce the liquidity
premium, there is nothing exclusively special about money. Actually, in more general settings where
other assets can aﬀect this premium (for instance, it might be the case that short run debt provides
liquidity as well), a permanent increase in such an asset can also generate the same eﬀect, and its
importance will also be subject to the same caveats about the expected path of interest rates and
credibility that we have analyzed.
Additionally, it is worth mentioning that unconventional monetary strategies might not necessarily
be the only (neither the most eﬀective) policy alternative available to use in a zero bound situation.
In particular, there are several ﬁscal tools that can be used as well. For instance, Christiano et al.
(2009) describe that the government-expenditure multiplier is actually quite large when the nominal
interest rate is at its lower bound. Additionally, Eggertsson (2006) highlights that government debt
can be used as a commitment device to ameliorate the credibility issues associated with the optimal
monetary policy. Our goal, however, was to analyze the virtues of these monetary alternatives, and
we left the interaction with ﬁscal tools for future research.32
Finally, an important extension that is left for future research is to rank the diﬀerent alternative
from the point of view of optimal policy. However, as we have argued, for this kind of exercises is
where having a more precise microfoundation of the diﬀerent channels is most relevant, as well as it
is to choose which shocks (and of which size) are the relevant to consider for this exercise.
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13A Technical Appendix
A.1 The Lower Bound, Anticipating Policy Changes and Credibility in Linear
Rational Expectation Models
Here we describe the algorithm to compute the policy exercises in the paper.33 The algorithm is
similar to that in Bodenstein et al. (2009), who consider how to compute impulses responses when,
given an initial shock, the interest rate reaches the lower bound endogenously through the Taylor rule.
Here, we additionally consider the possibility that the central bank chooses (exogenously, as a policy)
to drive the interest rate down to the lower bound for a certain period of time. Moreover, we allow
agents to assign an exogenous probability to the central bank breaking its promise an returning to the
usual rule before it was announced. We also show how to compute the equilibrium trajectories when
the unconventional policy is reversed, either surprisingly or anticipatedly.
The ﬁrst exercise we want to consider is when the central bank announces, at time t0, that the
interest rate is going to stay at the lower bound until period t1 −1, and starting at t1 the rate will be
determined by the Taylor Rule. The Taylor rule in “normal times” is constrained by the lower bound,




where i is the steady state value of the policy rate and the targeted policy rate is a linear function of
any variable in the model (for instance, i
target
t = φiit−1 + φππt + φyyt).34 In particular, this implies
that, even though the central bank can guarantee to keep the interest rate at the lower bound up to
period t1−1, the state of the economy could be such that the target rate is below −i at t1. Therefore,
because the algorithm works with the idea of backward induction, we ﬁrst describe how to compute
the equilibrium for a given initial value of the state variables and the exogenous process when the
policy rate is determined by the rule (6) (i.e. when the zero bound binds endogenously), and then we
explore the solution for the period in which the government sets the policy rate at the lower bound
(i.e. when the zero bound is imposed exogenously, as a policy choice).
At any point in time in which the it = i
target
t endogenously, the conditions characterizing a linear
rational expectations equilibrium can be written as
AEt{zt+1} = Bzt + Czt−1 + Det, (7)
where zt is a vector collecting endogenous variables (including it and i
target
t ), et are exogenous driving
forces following the process et = ρet−1+ut, ut is a vector of i.i.d random disturbances with zero mean,
and A,B,C,D are conformable matrices describing the linearized equilibrium conditions. In particular,
if n1 denotes the position in the vector zt of the variable it and n2 is the analogous for the variable i
target
t ,
there is an equation j the system such that (using Matlab notation) A(j,:) = C(j,:) = D(j,:) = 0
while B(j,n1) = −1, B(j,n2) = 1 and B(j,l) = 0 for l  = {n1,n2}. On the other hand, when it = −i,
33Although we focus on applying the technique for the case analyzed in the paper, notice that this method is quite
general and can accommodate many examples in these lines.
34It is however assumed that the constrain doesn’t bind at the steady state.
14the equilibrium is characterized by the system
AEt{zt+1} = ˜ Bzt + Czt−1 + Det + c, (8)
where ˜ B diﬀers from B only in that ˜ B(j,n2) = 0 and c is a column vector full of zeros except in
position j where c(j) = −i.
The algorithm works under the assumption (which we later discuss) that if, starting at any given
period t1, there is a period t ≥ t1 such that it = i
target
t , then it+j = i
target
t+j for j > 0 (i.e. if at some
point the constrain on the interest rate ceases to bind, it will not bind again after that). Let T denote
the minimum t ≥ t1 such the constrain is no longer binding (i.e. it = i
target
t for t ≥ T and iT−1 = −i)
and assume for the moment that T is known. Therefore, the solution characterizing the equilibrium
for t ≥ T –obtained using the usual techniques– can written as
zt = FTzt−1 + GTet. (9)
At period T − 1 the policy rate is at the lower bound and the equilibrium is characterized by
(8). Moreover, because agents know at T, iT = i
target
T , they will use (9) to form expectations, i.e.
ET−1{zT} = FTzT−1 + GTρeT−1. Therefore, we can write the equilibrium conditions at T − 1 as
A(FTzT−1 + GTρeT−1) = ˜ BzT−1 + CzT−2 + DeT−1 + c, (10)
which can be rearranged to obtain
zT−1 = (AFT − ˜ B)−1CzT−2 + (AFT − ˜ B)−1(D − AGTρ)eT−1 + (AFT − ˜ B)−1c,
≡ FT−1zT−2 + GT−1eT−1 + HT−1c, (11)
provided AFT − ˜ B being invertible. Working in this same way backwards until t1 we can compute the
equilibrium for t ∈ [t1,T − 1], which will have the form
zt = Ftzt−1 + Gtet + Htc. (12)
where
Jt ≡ (AFt+1 − ˜ B)−1,
Ft ≡ JtC,
Gt ≡ Jt(D − AGt+1ρ), (13)
Ht ≡ Jt(−AHt+1 + I) for t ∈ [t1,T − 2], HT−1 ≡ (AFT − ˜ B)−1.
Therefore, using these matrices, for initial values of zt1−1 and et1−1 we can obtain the perfect foresight
path (impulse response) for a given shock ut1, under the assumption that T is known. To ﬁnd T, we




Before moving to the case in which the central banks imposes the lower bound, two comments are
in order. First, notice that once T is found the assumption that it = i
target
t for t ≥ T can be veriﬁed
numerically by simulating the path for the variables for many periods beyond T (by construction,
15the assumption will hold in steady state). Second, as noticed also by Bodenstein et al. (2009), the
extension for the case in which, given values zt1−1 and ut1, the lower bound is expected to be reached
in a period after t1 is straight forward.
To consider the case in which the central bank announces, at time t0, that the interest rate is
going to stay at the lower bound until period t1 − 1, and starting at t1 the rate will be determined
by the Taylor Rule, notice that the matrices in (13) characterize any backward induction problem in
which the policy rate is expected to be at the lower last for a until a certain period of time. Therefore,
given an announced period t1 and an initial shock ut0, we can proceed as follows. First, assuming
that T = t1 (i.e. that after the period the central has announced the state of the economy is such
the constrain on the policy rate is not binding), compute the matrices characterizing the equilibrium
according to (13) and numerically verify whether it = i
target
t for t ≥ t1 or not. If that is not the case,
increase the candidate value for T until the condition is satisﬁed.35
We can also consider the role of exogenous credibility. In particular, we assume that in any every
period t ∈ [t0,t1 − 2] when the interest rate is ﬁxed, people assign a probability sequence pt to the
event that the central bank breaks its promise and sets the nominal interest rate according to the
Taylor rule staring on t + 1. Moreover, if this is the case, they believe that the Taylor rule will stay
forever. Additionally, regardless of people not trusting the central bank, we assume that (ex-post) it
fulﬁlls its promises.
This possibility is accommodated by simply modifying the equations in (13) to obtain,
Jt ≡ [A(p)tFt1 + (1 − pt)Ft+1) − ˜ B]−1,
Ft ≡ JtC,
Gt ≡ Jt[D − A(ptGt1 + (1 − pt)Gt+1)ρ],
Ht ≡ Jt[−A(1 − pt)Ht+1 + I] for t ∈ [t0,t1 − 2], Ht1−1 ≡ (AFt1 − ˜ B)−1.
Finally, to consider an unconventional policy in t0, we just assign values at t0 for the shocks
aﬀecting the diﬀerent instruments in the central bank’s balance sheet. Additionally, the alternative
of undoing these policies is also considered by placing appropriate values for the sequence ut: if the
change is not pre-announced we just change the value in the corresponding period, and if the change
is pre-announced we can expand the exogenous vector et to consider anticipated shocks.
A.2 The Model
Here we present the equilibrium conditions of the model, as well as the calibration of the parameters.
It is a standard new Keynesian model for a small open economy with incomplete asset markets.
Households have separable preferences in consumption and leisure and can transfer resources over
time using an internationally traded bond, as well as the debt created by the central bank. They
consume a combination of domestic and foreign goods. There is an inﬁnite number of monopolistic
intermediate good ﬁrms that use labor to produce using a constant returns-to-scale technology. They
are subject to a Calvo-type problem in setting prices, with full indexation to past inﬂation. The
35Notice that if we want to consider to ﬁx the interest rate not at zero but to any arbitrary value, this can be done by
setting an appropriate for the constance c.









































































Those related to ﬁrm’s choices are37
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36Variables without time subscripts denote steady state values. Prices have been rescaled by the price index.
37The assumption of full indexation to past inﬂation yields that, up to ﬁrst order, the distortion that in principle


















































t−1cpt−1 + tbt. (E.21)
Finally, monetary policy is as described in the text.
We calibrate the parameters following the structural estimation for Chile performed by Medina
and Soto (2007), and the steady state ratios of the variables in CB balance sheet are taken from the
average of the series used for estimation described in the text. The time period is meant to be a
quarter. Table 1 presents the parameters and steady state variables that were calibrated. Finally, we
assume that the frictions disappear in steady state. This implies that we need to introduce a demand
for real balances in steady state, which we choose to be M/P = y(i)− m.
Table 1: Calibration
σ 1 φ1 0.84 a 0.34
η 1.12 ǫ 11 η∗ 0.79
θ 0.74 ψd 0.01  m 0.2
ρi 0.74 απ 1.67 αy 0.39



























































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ ∆S






































−4 ∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ i1
Quarters









∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ r
Quarters
Note: y is real GDP, π is inﬂation, ∆S is nominal depreciation, rer is the real exchange
rate, rt ≡ i1,t − Etπt+1 is the ex-ante real interest rate. All variables are in log-deviations
from steady state. The the shock is permanent increase in B∗CB
t equivalent to a 10% of
nominal GDP in steady state, while iMP
t remains in its steady state value forever. The
solid line is the benchmark case, while the dashed-dotted line is the case with ϕd = ϕs = 0.





















































































−4 ∆M ⇒ i1
Quarters











Note: The solid line corresponds to a purchase of short debt, D1,t, and the dashed-dotted
line is purchase of long debt, Dk,t. The the shock is permanent increase in Mt equivalent
to a 10% of nominal GDP in steady state, while iMP
t remains in its steady state value
forever.












































∆D1 = −∆Dk ⇒ ∆S





































−4 ∆D1 = −∆Dk ⇒ i1
Quarters











−3 ∆D1 = −∆Dk ⇒ r
Quarters
Note: The the shock is permanent increase in D1,t equivalent to a 10% of nominal GDP
in steady state, while iMP
t remains in its steady state value forever.














































































−4 ∆B∗BC ⇒ i1
Quarters











Note: The solid line corresponds to new short debt, D1,t, and the dashed-dotted line is
new long debt, Dk,t. The the shock is permanent increase in B∗CB
t equivalent to a 10% of
nominal GDP in steady state, while iMP
t remains in its steady state value forever.
22Figure 5: Purchase of Foreign Assets Financed with a Monetary Expansion. Diﬀerent T’s, pt = 0.


































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ π








∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ ∆S



































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ iTP M
Quarters









∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ r
Quarters
Note: The solid, dashed-dotted, dashed and dotted lines correspond, respectively to T =
2,4,6,8. The the shock is permanent increase in B∗CB
t equivalent to a 10% of nominal
GDP in steady state, while iMP
t remains in its steady state value until T.
23Figure 6: Purchase of Foreign Assets Financed with a Monetary Expansion. T = 6, pt = pt, diﬀerent
p’s.
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∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ ∆S





































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ iTP M
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∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ r
Quarters
Note: The solid, dashed-dotted, dashed and dotted lines correspond, respectively to p =
0,0.3,0.6,0.9. The the shock is permanent increase in B∗CB
t equivalent to a 10% of nominal
GDP in steady state, while iMP
t remains in its steady state value until T.
24Figure 7: Purchase of Long Debt Financed with New Short Debt. Diﬀerent T’s, pt = 0.





































−∆Dk = ∆D1 ⇒ π










−∆Dk = ∆D1 ⇒ ∆S




































−3−∆Dk = ∆D1 ⇒ iM P
Quarters








−∆Dk = ∆D1 ⇒ r
Quarters
Note: The solid, dashed-dotted, dashed and dotted lines correspond, respectively to T =
2,4,6,8. The the shock is permanent increase in B∗CB
t equivalent to a 10% of nominal
GDP in steady state, while iMP
t remains in its steady state value until T.
25Figure 8: Purchase of Long Debt Financed with New Short Debt. T = 6, pt = pt, diﬀerent p’s.





































−∆Dk = ∆D1 ⇒ π









−∆Dk = ∆D1 ⇒ ∆S











































−3−∆Dk = ∆D1 ⇒ iM P
Quarters












−3 −∆Dk = ∆D1 ⇒ r
Quarters
Note: The solid, dashed-dotted, dashed and dotted lines correspond, respectively to p =
0,0.3,0.6,0.9. The the shock is permanent increase in B∗CB
t equivalent to a 10% of nominal
GDP in steady state, while iMP
t remains in its steady state value until T.
26Figure 9: Purchase of Foreign Assets Financed with a Monetary Expansion, Pre-announced reversal,
diﬀerent k’s































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ π







∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ ∆S

































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ iM P
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∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ r
Quarters


































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ B∗BC
Quarters
Note: The solid, dashed-dotted, dashed and dotted lines correspond, respectively to k =
2,3,4,5, with T = 6. The the shock is permanent increase in B∗CB
t equivalent to a 10%
of nominal GDP in steady state, that is fully reversed in T − k, while iMP
t remains in its
steady state value until T.
27Figure 10: Purchase of Foreign Assets Financed with a Monetary Expansion, Pre-announced gradual
reversal, diﬀerent k’s

































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ π





∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ ∆S
































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ iM P
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∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ r
Quarters



































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ B∗BC
Quarters
Note: The solid, dashed-dotted, dashed and dotted lines correspond, respectively to k =
2,3,4,5, with T = 6. The the shock is permanent increase in B∗CB
t equivalent to a 10% of
nominal GDP in steady state, that is reversed slowly startying at T −k, while iMP
t remains
in its steady state value until T.
28Figure 11: Purchase of Foreign Assets Financed with a Monetary Expansion, Pre-announced reversal,
pt = pt, diﬀerent p’s

































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ π






∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ ∆S

































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ iM P
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∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ r
Quarters


































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ B∗BC
Quarters
Note: The solid, dashed-dotted, dashed and dotted lines correspond, respectively to p =
0,0.3,0.6,0.9. The the shock is permanent increase in B∗CB
t equivalent to a 10% of nominal
GDP in steady state, that is fully reversed in T − k, with T = 6 and k = 4, while iMP
t
remains in its steady state value until T.
29Figure 12: Purchase of Foreign Assets Financed with a Monetary Expansion, Unexpected reversal,
diﬀerent k’s

































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ π







∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ ∆S



































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ iM P
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∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ r
Quarters


































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ B∗BC
Quarters
Note: The solid, dashed-dotted, dashed and dotted lines correspond, respectively to k =
2,3,4,5, with T = 6. The the shock is permanent increase in B∗CB
t equivalent to a 10% of
nominal GDP in steady state, that is fully reversed in T − k but is not anticipated, while
iMP
t remains in its steady state value until T.
30Figure 13: Purchase of Foreign Assets Financed with a Monetary Expansion, Unexpected gradual
reversal, diﬀerent k’s






























∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ π






∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ ∆S
































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ iM P
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∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ r
Quarters



































∆B∗BC = ∆M ⇒ B∗BC
Quarters
Note: The solid, dashed-dotted, dashed and dotted lines correspond, respectively to k =
2,3,4,5, with T = 6. The the shock is permanent increase in B∗CB
t equivalent to a 10%
of nominal GDP in steady state, that is reversed slowly startying at T − k but is not
anticipated, while iMP
t remains in its steady state value until T.
31Figure 14: Driving i
mp
t to zero. Diﬀerent T’s, pt = 0.


































































































Note: The solid, dashed-dotted, dashed and dotted lines correspond, to the response of
driving iMP
t to zero and keeping at this value until, respectively, T = 1,2,3,4.
32Figure 15: Driving i
mp
t to zero. T = 3, pt = pt, diﬀerent p’s.



































































































Note: The solid, dashed-dotted, dashed and dotted lines correspond, to the response of
driving iMP
t to zero and keeping at this value until T = 3, with pt = pt and, respectively,
p = 0,0.3,0.6,0.9.
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